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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Shaun Dill appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his
successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
According to Dill's allegations, on April 19, 2004, the district court entered
judgment of conviction on Dill for the crime of rape and sentenced Dill to a unified term
of 12 years with three years fixed. (R., p.2.) Dill did not appeal from the judgment of
conviction. (R., p.3.) On January 12, 2010, Dill filed a petition for post-conviction relief
a!leging violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and violations under Estrada
v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). (R., p.46.) On January 29, 2010, the
district court issued its Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
(Id.) The district court dismissed the petition on January 21, 2011. (Id.) Dill did not
appeal from that dismissal. (Id.)
On February 14, 2011, Dill filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief
asserting that his conviction and sentence violated the United States Constitution or the
Idaho Constitution, that material facts existed which were not previously heard and
which required vacation of his conviction and sentence in the interest of justice, that Dill
was innocent of the offense pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) through (f), and that
Dill's plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily.

(R., pp.2-5.)

The district court,

finding that Dill's successive petition was untimely and that he had failed to provide a
sufficient reason for not asserting the above claims in his original petition for postconviction relief, issued its Decision and 20 Day Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (R., pp.46-
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47.) Dill responded with his Petitioners [sic] Response In Opposition to Respondents
[sic] Intent To Dismiss, in which he reiterated his four new grounds for relief. (R., pp.4963.)

The district court dismissed Dill's successive petition on the grounds it had

previously stated. (R., pp.64-68.) Dill filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.70-72.)
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ISSUE
Has Dill failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's summary
dismissal of his untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Dill Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying His
Untimely Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
The district court, following the procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906,

summarily dismissed Dill's successive petition as being "untimely and/or for lack of any
sufficient reason as to why [the issues he raised] were not asserted in the original
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief." (R., p.47.) Dill appeals from that dismissal, arguing
that he suffered a miscarriage of justice.

(Appellant's brief, pp.2-7.)

Dill has failed,

however, to show any error by the district court in summarily dismissing his successive
petition for post-conviction relief. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits
on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Dill's Successive Post-Conviction Petition
Claims for post-conviction relief are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act (hereinafter "UPCPA").

J.C. § 19-4901,

et seq. Under the UPCPA, a

district court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when it "is
satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the
applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief," by indicating its intention to dismiss
4

and giving the parties an opportunity to respond within 20 days. 1.C. § 19-4906(b); see
also Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. Complying with the requirements
set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), the district court summarily dismissed Dill's
successive petition.

Dill filed his successive petition for post-conviction relief on

February 14, 2011.

(R., p.2.)

On May 10, 2011, the district court announced its

intention to dismiss Dill's successive petition on the grounds that Dill failed to present a
sufficient reason as to why the issues he raised were not asserted in his original petition
for post-conviction relief as required by Idaho Code § 19-4908, and that the petition was
untimely under Idaho Code§ 19-4902. (R., pp.46-47.) Twenty-one days later, on May
31, 2011, the district court summarily dismissed Dill's successive petition on the
grounds it had previously articulated. (R., pp.64-66.)

1.

Dill Failed To Provide A Sufficient Reason For Not Asserting The Claims
Raised In His Successive Post-Conviction Petition In His Original Petition

Under the UPCPA, the petitioner has the burden of establishing a sufficient
reason justifying the filing of a successive petition.

LC. § 19-4908.

The UPCPA

provides that:
all grounds for relief available to an applicant . . . must be raised in his
original, supplemental, or amended application. Any ground .. . not so
raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding
that resulted in the conviction . . . may not be the basis for a subsequent
application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for
sufficient reason was not asserted in the original, supplemental, or
amended application.
LC.§ 19-4908; see also Stuartv. State, 118 Idaho 932, 933-34, 801 P.2d 1283, 128485 (1990) (all legal and factual grounds for relief must be raised in the first petition for
post-conviction relief and any grounds for relief not raised are permanently waived if the
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grounds were known or should have been known at the time of the first petition); accord
Lake v. State, 126 Idaho 333, 336, 882 P.2d 988, 991 (Ct. App. 1994). As explained by
the Idaho Court of Appeals, this section prohibits the filing of a second application for
post-conviction relief unless the applicant shows sufficient reason why the issues could
not have been raised in the prior application. See Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 94748, 908 P.2d 1252, 1254-55 (Ct. App. 1995). Where the applicant fails to meet the
burden of establishing a sufficient reason for why the grounds for relief asserted in a
successive petition for post-conviction relief were not asserted in the original
~

application, his petition must be dismissed.

In his successive petition for post-conviction relief, Dill claimed that:
(a) The conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state.
(b) There exists evidence of material facts not previously presented and
heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest
of justice.
(c) Subject to the Provisions of Section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense.
(d) Plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily.
(R., p.3.) All of these claims were either known or should have been known to Dill when
he filed his original petition for post-conviction relief.

Throughout his successive

petition, accompanying affidavit, and response to the district court's intention to dismiss
his successive petition, Dill failed to offer any reason, let alone a sufficient reason, for
why he did not present these claims in his original petition. (See R., pp.2-5, 7-28, 4963.) Because Dill failed to meet his burden of establishing a sufficient reason to file a
successive petition under Idaho Code § 19-4908, the district court properly dismissed
Dill's successive petition. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
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2.

Dill's Successive Petition Was Untimely

To be timely, the UPCPA requires that a post-conviction proceeding be
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the
time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of
proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later."

I.C. § 19-4902(a).

Dill was

convicted for rape on April 19, 2004. (R., p.2.) Dill did not appeal from the judgment of
conviction. (R., p.3.) On January 12, 2010, almost six years later, Dill filed his original
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.46.) The petition was dismissed on January 21,
2011. (Id.) On February 14, 2011, Dill filed a successive petition for post-conviction
relief. (R., pp.2-5.) Dill's successive petition, filed almost seven years after his initial
conviction, is clearly brought outside the limitations period of Idaho Code § 19-4902(a).
Idaho appellate courts have recognized that the limitations period for raising a
post-conviction claim may be equitably tolled in circumstances where the petitioner
lacks access to the courts or where the petitioner has only recently discovered the
factual basis for his claim. See Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250-51, 220 P.3d
1066, 1069-70 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874
(2007). However, absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitations period should
be tolled, the petition remains time barred and must be dismissed. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 30 P.3d 967, 968-69 (2001); Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,
_ , 256 P.3d 791, 793 (Ct. App. 2011).

Dill has failed to show that the limitations

period on his post-conviction proceedings should have been equitably tolled.
In certain circumstances, Idaho appellate courts have also allowed successive
petitions for post-conviction relief, filed outside of the limitations period articulated in
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Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a), to relate back to prior, timely filed petitions for post-conviction
relief. See, e.g., Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904-05, 174 P.3d at 874-75; Hernandez v.
State, 133 Idaho 794, 799-800, 992 P.2d 789, 794-95 (Ct. App. 1999). Nothing in these
cases, however, excuses the UPCPA's requirement that the original post-conviction
proceeding must be commenced within the limitations period, absent a showing that the
petition is due equitable tolling. Therefore, even if Dill's successive petition could relate
back to his original petition for post-conviction relief, it would still be untimely because
the original petition was itself filed more than four and a half years after the limitations
period had expired. Under any standard, Dill's successive petition for post-conviction
relief is therefore untimely, and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
summarily dismissing Dill's successive petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 31st day of January, 2012.

~u~
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of January 2012, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing a copy in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
MICHAEL SHAUN DILL
!DOC #73589
ISCI
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

CR~
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/prn
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